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Rivalry between the agencies has done incalculable damage not only to them but also to the nation |
On the chilly evening of 25 January in 1995 Governor General (rtd) KV Krishna Rao was reviewing the Republic Day preparations with top security and intelligence officers at the Jammu Raj Bhawan. Rao had also invited then chiefs of Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to prepare a plan for border infrastructure and development. On his last trip to Krishnaghati border areas, Rao was left impressed by the development and easy accessibility to the other side of LoC. After scribbling down suggestions in a scrapbook, Rao turned to then RAW chief CD Sahay for suggestions.
Sahay, who seemed to be in a pensive mood,
apologised that he did not have many suggestions on border development,
but he could tell what would happen the day after (January 26) when the
Governor would preside the flag hoisting ceremony at the Maulana Azad
stadium in Jammu. A bomb literally exploded at Rao’s feet next day. He
escaped only because the handlers had pressed wrong buttons on the
remote and erred in the timing. A bomb ripped the stage and another one
exploded near the gate and a third one destroyed the parking lot.
A combing operation had been launched at
Sahay’s behest, but the Japanese plastic timers could not be found, till
they exploded.
Former intelligence sleuths say that
information had been culled just by sheer accident. Sahay, before going
to the meeting, had consulted his colleagues and asked if there was
something to discuss with the Governor. “Nothing new Sir, just routine,”
they had all replied. Sahay had then asked for some recent files
consigned to the record room, since his last meeting with Rao. There
were 13 files and to his horror, six of them had explicitly mentioned
the impending attack on Republic Day in great detail. Nobody had read
the intelligence sent by deep-penetration agents, nor had it been
analysed or assessed. There was nobody to blame. The files had been
consigned to cupboards with the signatures of Sahay himself. The lone
deviation from the plan was that unnerved militants had detonated the
bomb in the parking lot first instead of the one beneath the stage.
The recent terror attack in Delhi has again
highlighted that more than the lack of intelligence, the lack of
coordination, assessment and turf-war between various security agencies
has taken its the toll on the security arrangement. Former deputy Chief
of RAW’s technical wing Major General VK Singh writes that the rivalry
between the three major intelligence agencies—RAW, IB and MI—has done
incalculable damage not only to the agencies themselves but also to the
nation. “The rivalry is to the extent that once on a Srinagar hilltop, I
counted almost a dozen antennae, each belonging to a different agency
or paramilitary forces. And all of them were intercepting the same radio
transmissions from across the border or from militant groups. In most
cases, the intercepts were finally going to the same consumer,” he said.
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In terms of coordination, in the aftermath of
the Kargil war, there were lots of changes. The National Security
Council, National Technical Resources Organisation (NTRO), Defence
Intelligence Agency were all set up. But the problems of coordination
persisted. Senior spy masters believe that Home Minister P Chidambaram’s
idea of a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and NATGRID would
also join the same league.
“We are still trying to find solutions and have
not been able to identify causes and issues involving intelligence and
what is required. There is sheer volume of intelligence coming up on
desk every day. Eighty five per cent information is from open sources.
Rest of the 15 per cent is also enormous, mind boggling. Processing,
evaluation and dissemination is a big task. It is an exercise that
demands mental ability,” a former intelligence officer told TEHELKA.
While Chidambaram’s initiative to interact with
all agencies is laudable, it runs the risk of not being professional
enough. Besides, setting up of NCTC would make other agencies
subservient to the home ministry. Officials fear that the NCTC would
grow too big for its boots and it may even lead to the authority of the
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) getting compromised.
The system in place for Military Intelligence
(MI) has also deteriorated over the past few years. A former chief of
the MI refers to the new post of a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
that was created. “But in absence of a CDS (chief of defence services),
this post hardly means anything. He has no powers, works merely on the
basis of friendship and personal clout and contacts,” he said.
There is also strong opposition to
Chidambaram’s idea of making intelligence subordinate to anti-terror
measures only. A former special director of IB, DC Nath told a seminar
last year that there was need for a clinically professional intelligence
system and not one that suits the government. Top sleuths wonder why
the government cannot make up its mind to designate a nodal agency.
At present, with agencies relying more on
technical intelligence system such as intercepting telephones, internet,
e-mails etc, human assets are depleting gradually. The China desk at
the RAW has just few hands to monitor mandarin language newspapers.
Increasingly, a similar scenario is emerging with the number of
officials well-versed in Urdu, Dari and Pashtu dwindling. Such is the
focus on technical intelligence, that Major General (retd) V K Singh
disclosed a few years ago how Indian agencies had been mishandling the
SEA-ME-WE submarine cable set up in 2000 connecting Western Europe,
Middle East and South East Asia. This cable is the main source of
connectivity not only for telephones but also for new technologies such
as broadband services, Internet, video services and the ATM.
In its bid to emulate the CIA, the General says
the RAW has been unnecessarily tapping telephone traffic and wasting
resources say between Germany and Japan and other countries in violation
of international laws.
A race for quick results
Another aspect that resulted in damaging the intelligence system was the urge to show quick results. The trend, however, has stopped since Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister. It had been a routine affair to declare conclusion of a terror incident within few hours of booking innocents or those remotely linked with the act. Not only it allowed the terrorists to enjoy the last laugh, it also created social tensions and led to further insecurity in the country.
Another aspect that resulted in damaging the intelligence system was the urge to show quick results. The trend, however, has stopped since Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister. It had been a routine affair to declare conclusion of a terror incident within few hours of booking innocents or those remotely linked with the act. Not only it allowed the terrorists to enjoy the last laugh, it also created social tensions and led to further insecurity in the country.
Few years ago two former informers of Delhi
Police's Special Cell and the IB Irshad Ali and Nawab Moarif Qamar
spilled the beans, when they were implicated in a false case for
refusing to swallow IB's bait. Their lawyer Sufiyan Siddique claims that
the intelligence officers had directed them to join Lashkar-e-Toiba and
were forcing them to join a training camp across the border. "Fearing
for their lives, the duo refused, which infuriated the agencies, and the
duo was booked and implicated in a false case," he added.
Irshad Ali's case has now been well documented
by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on the directions of Delhi
High Court. The CBI corroborated the fact that the duo was kidnapped by
an IB officer Mohamamd Khalid alias Majid in league with the Special
Cell officials Lalit, Bhushan, Rajinder and Devdutt.
Talking about the working of the sleuths in the
IB, Irshad alleges that they just concoct stories to keep the
government on its toes about the imaginary terrorist threats. To back
their claims, Irshad reveals that they also ‘create’ terrorists. "A
Moulvi type agent sporting a long beard and well-versed with Islamic
tenants is introduced to some Muslim locality, where he lodges himself
near a mosque and, in some cases, inside a mosque itself."
Irshad further reveals that targeting mostly
educated Muslim youth, the ‘pious-looking’ Moulvi laments the condition
of Muslims and prescribes “jihad" as the only solution. After winning
their confidence, the Moulvi then introduces himself as LeT commander
and recruits the youth. "They are partially trained in small arms
operation. In the meantime, the agent keeps sleuths informed about his
operation," says Irshad.
"Finally, when the Commander identifies a place
and calls for an operation, the stage is set for their entrapment. The
IB informs the Special Cell, and these youth fall prey to the plan.
While the innocent youth remain clueless, the commander is never found.
He is back with the IB to explore newer pastures," alleges the former
informer.
These revelations were enough to explain what
must have happened behind Batla House encounter. Police is yet to
explain that how one accused despite heavy police bandobast gave them a
slip.
Both the Special Cell and the IB have procured
huge farm hourses in the vicinity of Delhi to undertake unlawful
activities. Those destined to be killed in fake encounters are not kept
in police stations or at known facilities, but are lodged in these farm
houses. They are detained for months and years there before being killed
at an "appropriate time".
A question of accountability
Prominent strategic affairs expert Manoj Joshi wrote recently that India was perhaps the only democracy where no oversight is exercised on our all-powerful intelligence services. Our politicians’ are only interested in the IB for providing them with political intelligence on their adversaries. The IB’s goals is two-fold. First, they want to short-circuit the process of dealing with terrorists. But to allow an instrument of state to illegally arrogate such a key function is to invite trouble. Second, the IB uses fake encounters to send messages to Pakistan. The executioners of the mainly Pakistani terrorists are the special cells of state police forces. But over time these executioners, glorified as “encounter specialists”, end up as criminals and resort to killing innocents for personal gains.
Prominent strategic affairs expert Manoj Joshi wrote recently that India was perhaps the only democracy where no oversight is exercised on our all-powerful intelligence services. Our politicians’ are only interested in the IB for providing them with political intelligence on their adversaries. The IB’s goals is two-fold. First, they want to short-circuit the process of dealing with terrorists. But to allow an instrument of state to illegally arrogate such a key function is to invite trouble. Second, the IB uses fake encounters to send messages to Pakistan. The executioners of the mainly Pakistani terrorists are the special cells of state police forces. But over time these executioners, glorified as “encounter specialists”, end up as criminals and resort to killing innocents for personal gains.
One of the major causes behind the rise of
terrorism lies a sense of injustice. Fake encounters and extra-judicial
killings only help terrorist recruiting agents. Upholding the law, and
insisting that the police do so most rigorously, should not be a matter
of morality and legality, but the pragmatic means of combating
terrorism. Extra-judicial executions may work as a quick fix, but make
for a recipe for disaster in the long run. If you sow the wind, the
saying goes, you will reap the whirlwind.
A group of prominent intellectuals and peace
activists, comprising Asghar Ali Engineer, Ram Puniyani and several
others, have demanded that a National Commission be set up to monitor
the progress of investigations into terror attack cases. This might help
speed up the process of investigations, find valuable clues to nail
culprits, provide justice to victims, and prevent future attacks.
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